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DRUG MARKETS AND URBAN VIOLENCE: 
Can tackling one reduce the other?
The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme (BFDPP) is an initiative dedicated to providing a rigorous, independent review 
of the effectiveness of national and international drug policies. The aim of this programme of research and analysis is to assemble 
and disseminate material that supports the rational consideration of complex drug policy issues, and leads to a more effective 
management of the widespread use of psychoactive substances in the future. The BFDPP currently chairs the International 
Drug Policy Consortium (www.idpc.info), a global network of NGOs and professional networks who work together to promote 
objective debate around national and international drug policies, and provide advice and support to governments in the search 
for effective policies and programmes. 
INTRODUCTION
One of the most worrying aspects of the global trade in illicit 
drugs is the link to urban violence. This is a leading cause of 
death in many countries.  It is also linked to other harms, such as 
morbidity, reductions in economic growth and the opportunity 
costs of investments in incarceration, police forces and private 
security which attempt to control violence. This Report builds on 
other Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme publications 
that have looked at issues of crime prevention, treatment and drug 
markets (Stevens, Hallam, & Trace, 2006; Stevens, Trace, & Bewley-
Taylor, 2005; Wilson & Stevens, 2008).  Here we look specifically 
at the strength of the link between drug markets and urban violence, 
and policies and tactics that can be used to reduce this link. 
RATES OF URBAN VIOLENCE
In recent years, the Caribbean has taken over from Latin America 
as the region most affected by lethal violence (UNODC & World 
Bank, 2007). Murder rates in Jamaica have reached 58 per 100,000 
population, with the city of Kingston most affected by violent disputes 
between rival gangs.  Some Latin American cities have become less 
murderous than they were in the 1990s. Bogotá, for example, used to 
be known as the most violent city in the World, but its murder rate 
declined to 21 per 100,000 population in 2004.  By contrast, violence 
has escalated in Caracas. Its murder rate in 2005 has been estimated 
at 130 per 100,000. No other city recorded such extreme murder rates, 
although New Orleans and Cape Town both have estimated rates of 
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over 60 murders per 100,000. US cities vary widely in their murder 
rates. Nationally, homicide fell from historically high levels between 
1993 and 2005, since when it has risen again (Braga, Pierce, McDevitt, 
Bond, & Cronin, 2008). In 2005, Baltimore had a murder rate of 42 and 
Washington DC had a rate of 35 per 100,000.  But homicide in places 
like New York and Los Angeles has fallen dramatically since the early 
1990s. New York is now one of the safest cities in the USA, having a 
murder rate of 7 per 100,000 in 2005. But it still has a higher rate than 
most European cities. In this continent, only Moscow, Tallinn and 
Vilnius have rates higher than New York. Glasgow has a slightly lower 
rate, but most European capitals – including London, Berlin, Brussels, 
Paris, Helsinki and Dublin - have much lower rates, around 2 or 3 per 
100,000 of population. Rates in Auckland and Sydney are comparable. 
Tokyo’s murder rate is lower at 1.4 per 100,000. Murder rates in many 
other cities are not systematically reported. It is important to note that 
murder is of course not the only form of violence.  Indeed, it is the 
rarest. Violence in general is very difficult to define (de Haan, 2008), 
but can include threats, assaults, sexual violations and other forms of 
interpersonal conflict.
1    Alex Stevens is Senior Research Fellow, School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research, 
University of Kent, UK. Dave Bewley-Taylor is a Senior Lecturer, School of Humanities, Swansea 
University, UK and Associate Consultant Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Programme. Pablo Dreyfus 
is research coordinator of the Small Arms Control Project, Viva Rio, Brazil. He was responsible for the 
research and drafting of the Rio de Janeiro case study.
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Drug markets are often blamed for the elevated level of all these 
forms of violence in many cities.  Nevertheless, these figures on 
homicide, and their lack of direct correlation to the presence of drug 
markets, suggest that other factors are also influential.  Indeed, it is 
highly unlikely that eradication of drug markets, however implausible 
that might be, would cause urban violence to simply disappear  This 
Report, however, will attempt to analyse the link between drug 
markets and urban violence in order to draw out lessons on how levels 
of violence can be reduced. It will pay particular attention to one city: 
Rio de Janeiro. This central case study shows the serious danger 
of allowing a violent drug market to become institutionalised in a 
city, and the grave problems associated with efforts to repress drug 
markets through violent action by the state.  Examples from other 
cities, including Boston, New York and London, will also be used. 
The link between drug markets and violence has often been examined 
through the “tripartite framework” developed by Goldstein in New 
York (Goldstein, 1985). This categorises three types of link between 
illicit drugs and violence. The first is the psycho-pharmacological link, 
where violence is associated with the effects of drugs in stimulating 
anxiety and aggression in users. The second is economic-compulsive, 
which comes from dependent users having to commit crimes to feed 
their habit. The third is systemic violence. This type is perhaps the 
most interesting for this Report. It is important to remember that 
violence is not the only way that conflicts in drug markets are dealt 
with. Other strategies used by drug dealers include negotiation, 
avoidance and tolerance (Jacques & Wright, 2008). However, since 
participants in the illicit drug market have no recourse to legal methods 
for avoiding and settling dispute they do often engage in violence to 
protect reputation, revenue, territory and profits.  The extraordinarily 
high profit margins that are available to drug traffickers and dealers 
also provide great incentives to take the risks to both life and liberty 
that come with violent behaviour.  (See Beckley Foundation Drug 
Policy Programme Report Number 14 on drug markets (Wilson & 
Stevens, 2008, http://idpc.info/php-bin/documents/BFDPP_RP_14_
UnderstandDrgMkts_EN.pdf) 
   
CASE STUDY 1: Not so marvelous: drug trafficking, 
violence and failed policies in Rio de Janeiro 
Rio de Janeiro is a megalopolis of about 6 million inhabitants 
(almost 11 million if its metropolitan area is considered). Its 
inhabitants (known as cariocas) call it the “marvelous city” because 
of its natural beauty, its tourist attractions, its cordial people and 
its rich cultural background.  However, the city has experienced 
economic crisis since the 1980s and this has led to deep 
inequalities within society and a high proportion of employment 
in the informal economy (Urani, Fontes, Chermont & Rocha 
n/d; Paes de Barros, Mendoça & Rocha, 1995). The 1980s also 
saw the rise of the cocaine industry in South America and Brazil 
joined the illicit industry as a supplier of chemical precursors for 
the production of cocaine in the Andean Countries, as well as 
being a main trafficking route to consumption markets such as 
Western Europe, South Africa and, secondarily, the United States 
(Dreyfus, 2002; Downdey, 2002:25). While it is true that other 
illegal markets are responsible for generating high levels of urban 
violence within the city, the illicit drug market has undeniably 
had an extraordinarily deleterious impact upon the lives of many 
inhabitants of the favelas.*  
The drug market: from ruthless monopoly to chaotic 
oligopoly  
The recurrent and historical lack of State presence in the favelas 
of Rio de Janeiro enabled the emergence of criminal organizations 
that control these areas. While these groups use firearms bought 
in transnational markets, Brazil also has a thriving small arms 
and ammunition industry of its own. This industry has only been 
effectively regulated since 2003. Inequality, high demographic 
density, uncompleted primary school studies, lack of opportunities 
to access the legal economy, and weak family structures are among 
the main factors that can be seen to provoke the involvement of 
young men (between 15 and 29 years old) in organized crime 
and armed violence (Dreyfus & Bandeira, 2006; Dreyfus, Lessing & 
Purcena, 2005;  Small Arms Survey, 2007). 
Widespread police and institutional corruption has also enabled 
the development of drug distribution networks and diminished 
the law enforcement capabilities of the State (Câmara dos 
Deputados, 2000). Cocaine, and coca paste consumed in Rio de 
Janeiro and other Brazilian cities is mainly produced in Bolivia 
(UNODC, 2007). By the year 2000, it was estimated that around 
44.4 wholesale tonnes or 171.4 US$ million worth of cocaine 
were entering the city to be then cut and sold at the street 
level (Dowdney, 2003). By the late 1990’s, it was estimated that 
there were 500 drug retailing “areas” (there are around 700 
favelas in the city) of which 30 to 50 areas (the most profitable) 
had a commercial sales (movimento) of about 3000 small doses 
(“papeis”) of cocaine per day (Misse, 1997). This quantity may 
double during weekends. Each consumer purchased, on average, 
5 to 10 papeis per transaction (Misse, 1997). In 2003 it was 
estimated that drug faction employees accounted for around 1% 
of Rio´s favela population (meaning around 10,000 people). They 
are armed, leaving aside handguns, with about 1,500 assault rifles 
and other automatic weapons (Dowdney, 2003, p.51). These 
faction members are part of a larger illicit working force in 
underground illicit activities in the city, such us illegal gambling, 
prostitution, irregular transportation and clandestine sales of 
counterfeited goods (Misse, 1997).
3There have been networks of illicit drug distribution in Rio de 
Janeiro since the 1950s. These were linked to the consumption of 
marijuana within the favelas, prisons and a number of established 
points in the city usually related to delinquent activities such as 
illegal gambling and prostitution (Misse, 1999, Misse 1997). In 
the 1970s the consumption of marijuana expanded to middle 
class students and intellectuals (Misse, n/d). Marijuana trafficking 
was, however, diffuse and carried out by community members 
to a small and localized clientele (Dowdney, 2003). Due to 
cocaine’s greater profitability, Rio de Janeiro’s drugs market was 
restructured during the 1980s in terms of its scale, organization 
and the armed competition and territorial disputes between rival 
factions (Dowdney, 2003, p.26). 
As explained by the anthropologist Luke Dowdney, the current 
crime networks that retail illicit drugs in Rio de Janeiro originate 
in the prison system, and are recreated, structured and even 
organized through that system: 
“The systematic organisation of Rio de Janeiro’s retail drug market has its 
roots in prison with the creation of the first and arguably still the most 
powerful drug faction, the Comando Vermelho. In response to the rising 
number of bank robberies being carried out by anti-government groups 
in order to finance revolutionary activities against Brazil’s military state 
apparatus [….], the government introduced by decree article 27 of the 
National Security Law of 1969 (Lei de Segurança Nacional). As a result, all 
suspects of armed robbery of banking, financial or credit institutions were 
tried by a military court. If convicted, perpetrators of these crimes faced 
between 10-24 years in a maximum-security prison, or the death penalty if 
any fatalities occurred during the robbery. Therefore, between 1969-1976 
political and common-law prisoners mingled in a number of maximum-
security prisons including Cândido Mendes on Ilha Grande, three hours 
West of Rio de Janeiro. […] As a result, a number of imprisoned bank 
robbers formed a group called ‘the collective’ (o coletivo) at the end of the 
1970s, which was to become known as the Falange Vermelha and later 
the Comando Vermelho The Falange Vermelha originally concerned itself 
with group protection and domination of the prison population, as well 
as securing rights within the prison system. However, its real importance 
within the city’s criminal structure came when its members realised that 
their internal prison organisation could be used to organise crime outside 
of prison for profitable gain. Being based in prison, the Comando Vermelho 
had power over its members both within and outside the prison system, 
as every professional criminal knows that if released they may one day 
be rearrested and incarcerated again. Failing to fulfill the Comando 
Vermelho’s instructions whilst free, would mean returning to prison as a 
traitor to be punished by the group [….] The Comando Vermelho was 
born in prison and its power remains there to this day. By the end of the 
1970s the Comando Vermelho’s incarcerated members began to organise 
criminal activity (primarily bank robberies and kidnappings) within Rio 
de Janeiro and were subsequently able to buy their freedom with illicit 
earnings dutifully brought into prison.”  (Dowdney, 2003:20)
This “coalition” of local criminal leaders took over the traditional 
marijuana retailing points between 1983 and 1986 and organized 
a territorially based structure for the distribution of the more 
lucrative cocaine. The Comando Vermelho is not a highly 
structured body, but a group of independent local leaders (donos) 
joined through loose alliances. This single faction monopoly did 
not last long. The death of some important founding members of 
the Comando Vermelho in the second half of the 1980s - as well 
as the high profits generated by some strategic retailing points 
in the city - led to distrust, rivalry and armed competition. By 
the mid 1990s, other factions led by new (and younger) donors 
emerged. These included the Terceiro Comando and Amigos 
dos Amigos (Dowdney, 2003). The three groups are now in 
permanent armed competition and exert a violent domination 
over Rio´s favelas. This permanent killing combined with the 
saturation of the consumption market and a decrease in drug 
profits has led to a weakening of the drug factions during the 
current decade (Dreyfus, 2007; Misse, 2007; De Souza e Silva, 
Lannes Fernandes & Braga, 2008).  The decline of the drug 
factions combined with a continuing lack of State control within 
the favelas enabled another kind of illicit armed group to grow in 
influence.  These are the so-called “milícias; ”vigilante organizations 
formed by retired and active duty policemen and firemen. Their 
aim is to drive traffickers and drug consumers out of poor 
neighbourhoods and exert a new kind of territorial control 
based on the use of violence and financed by racketeering to 
local commerce and the administration of other illicit activities 
such as illegal gambling, irregular public transportation networks 
and irregular cable TV and electricity services. (Dreyfus, 2007; 
Misse, 2007; De Souza e Silva, Lannes Fernandes and Braga, 2008) 
Whether or not the milícias will also become involved in drug 
trafficking is a question only time will answer. The lack of State 
presence and the limited capacity of State institutions (which 
are compromised by corruption) are at the core this process of 
illegal armed territorial control in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro 
(Dreyfus, 2007).  
Mistaken policies and policing: the costs of Rio de 
Janeiro’s peculiar war on drugs 
Rio de Janeiro’s policies regarding drug trafficking and use have 
followed the general national policy trend and legislation: they 
have focused on repression.  In Brazil, the law enforcement powers 
of the municipal governments are very limited; in fact, according 
to the national constitution, law enforcement is a prerogative 
of federal and state security forces. Each state in Brazil has two 
police forces, an investigative police (the civilian police) and a 
preventive police (the military police). Since the late 1980s when 
the increasing territorial control and armed power of the drug 
factions became evident, successive governments of the State of 
Rio de Janeiro opted for a “war on drugs approach”. The main 
instrument in this war on drugs has been the Military Police 
4(particularly through special and heavily armed intervention units) 
and specialized intervention units of the Civilian Police.** Instead 
of supporting community policing programmes that would allow 
an eventual penetration of state institutions and some sense of the 
rule of the law within the favelas, historically State governments 
have preferred “invasive” and “siege” approaches, characterized 
by violent, brief and lethal irruptions and by sporadic controls 
and searches in the surrounding areas or main accessing points 
(Downdney, 2003; Ribeiro, Dias and Carvalho, 2008). The number of 
deaths registered as “resistance to authority” (autos de resistência) 
during police operations climbed from 427 casualties in 2000 to 
1330 in 2007 (ISP, 2007).  This approach to the problem has caused 
a spiral of violence and an arms race between the police and the 
traffickers. The inefficacy of this all on policy is aggravated by the 
provision of protection and diverted small arms by corrupted 
sectors of the police in exchange of money or drugs (for later 
retail). These extortive practices also happen at a minor scale with 
small retailers and drug consumers who must pay a bribe in order 
not to be arrested (Misse, 2007).
At the national level a major change occurred in 2006, when - under 
the administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva - a new 
drug control law (number 11343 of August 2006) was introduced. 
This law still classes drug possession and use as a crime, however, 
it makes a clear difference between traffickers and users. In the 
case of users or possession for personal use it offers rehabilitation, 
community service or a simple warning from the judge, rather 
than jail.  It is left to the judge to define on a case by case basis, 
which drug quantity should be defined as for personal use.  The 
administration of President Lula also created a new drug control 
policy that provides treatment for drug dependents, establishes 
the need for a partnership between government and civil society 
for drug prevention and also introduces the concept of harm 
reduction (Olinger, 2007a, and 2007b).  So far, in Rio de Janeiro, this 
change in the legislation has only been only reflected in the fact 
that the government shifted its focus from repressing consumption, 
possession and trafficking to focusing almost exclusively on 
repression though the war on drugs model described above 
(Misse, 2007). This model has proved to be ineffective: the drug 
factions still control the favelas,  illicit drugs are openly available, 
and the prevalence of cocaine use in big cities in the south east of 
Brazil (where Rio de Janeiro is located) rose from 2.6% in 2001 to 
3.7% in 2007 (CEBRI, 2001; CEBRI, 2005).
* It is important to recognize the role of markets surrounding among other things the illegal 
lottery, video poker machines and clandestine transport networks in the generation of 
violence within the city. 
** These have been the focus of the highly acclaimed and controversial Brazilian film Elite 
Squad (José Padilha, 2007)
HOw STRONG IS THE LINK 
BETwEEN DRUG MARKETS AND 
VIOLENCE?
If a city has a drug market, it does not automatically mean that it will 
be particularly violent. For example, Washington DC apparently has 
a murder rate that is 5 times higher than New York. But the estimated 
prevalence of last year use of crack is the same (at 0.3% of the 
population), and heroin use is apparently lower in Washington than 
in New York (SAMHSA, 2006). However, there have been many 
studies that link drug markets to violence. For example, a study of 
eight cities by the US National Institute of Justice found that those 
cities with larger markets for crack cocaine tended to have higher 
rates of homicide. There was no association between levels of use 
of other drugs and murder (Lattimore, Riley, Trudeau, Leiter, & 
Edwards, 1997). Since then, there have been many studies that have 
suggested a link between crack markets and violence, including 
reports that attribute the fall in homicide in the USA (and New York 
City in particular) to the decline in crack use (Blumstein, Rivara, 
& Rosenfeld, 2000; Bowling, 1999; Messner, Galea, Tardiff, Tracy, 
Bucciarelli, Piper et al., 2007). Other factors are also mentioned in 
these studies, including economic change, policing tactics, increased 
incarceration, demographics (e.g. the proportion of young men in 
the population) and the availability of firearms.
Research from Latin America highlights the importance of socio-
economic factors. There are very wide differences in the rates 
of violence between the nations of Latin America.  For example, 
Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay have been noted for 
having rates of violence that are lower than the global average. But 
Colombia, El Salvador, Venezuela and Honduras have had rates 
over three times the global average (Briceno-Leon, Villaveces, & 
Concha-Eastman, 2008). Briceno-Leon and his colleagues find that 
it is those countries with the highest rates of poverty, combined 
with high rates of urbanisation, that have the highest murder rates. 
They argue that drug markets have a part to play in explaining 
these differences, but that lack of employment opportunities, urban 
segregation, a culture of extreme masculinity and easy availability 
of guns and alcohol are also important. 
The complexities of the link between drug markets and violence 
mean that we should pay attention to – at least – the influence of 
different types of drug market and the different social contexts in 
which they operate.
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There are various stages in the journey of a drug from crop to consumer. 
Each is associated with various forms of violence. These stages are:
Production•	
Transit•	
Distribution•	
At the production stage, violence is employed in controlling the crops 
from which drugs are produced. For example, individuals and groups 
who want to protect their crops from being seized by state agencies 
or criminal rivals may use violent methods. This has been seen most 
frequently in Colombia in clashes between farmers and factions of the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) or its paramilitary 
opponents (Vargas, 2005). Violence is also employed by state agencies 
in attempting to deter production and destroy or confiscate the drugs. 
Direct forms of violence have the highest profile in Afghanistan. Here, 
the Taleban severely restricted opium production in 2001 through 
threats of violence to farmers who grew opium (Farrell & Thorne, 2005). 
NATO soldiers are currently engaged in ongoing deadly operations to 
control the opium fields of Helmand and other provinces. According 
to press reports, military sources acknowledge that faulty intelligence 
has led to civilian casualties in these operations (Sengupta, 2008). 
Elsewhere less direct forms of violence have included the poisoning 
and displacement of farmers through the use of aerial fumigation - 
which has severely damaged Colombia’s rainforest (Livingstone, 
2004; Ramirez Lemus, Stanton, & Walsh, 2005) - and the forced 
labour of workers in rural Brazil to grow or destroy marijuana crops 
(Transnational Institute, 2004). 
Significant levels of violence are associated with the transit of drugs 
to markets in Europe and the USA through regions such as Central 
America, the Caribbean and increasingly West Africa.  The most brutal 
violence at the time of writing is concentrated in the border towns of 
Mexico, where heavily armed trafficking gangs are involved in intense 
conflict amongst themselves and with state authorities.  These so-called 
‘cartels’ have long been the target of Mexican and US attempts to halt 
the trafficking of cocaine, methamphetamine and marijuana into the 
USA.  The United Nations estimates that 90% of the cocaine consumed 
in the USA enters through Mexico, with the other 10% entering via the 
Caribbean (UNODC, 2008a). Following the imprisonment of several 
leaders of the Gulf ‘cartel’ in 2003, the Sinaloa ‘cartel’ aggressively 
attempted to seize control of their lucrative smuggling routes.  The 
conflict this unleashed produced an upsurge of violence in border cities 
such as Tijuana, Nuevo Laredo and Cuidad Juárez.  Official responses 
to this phenomenon, however, have been undermined by corruption 
within many parts of the Mexican law enforcement apparatus. 
According to the Mayor of Juarez, for example, “Corruption is so 
strong with the [city police] force, there are so many inside deals, that 
the criminals hardly worry about getting caught.  (Campo-Flores & 
Campbell, 2008).  Perhaps more significant, amidst allegations of links 
to the Sinaloa ‘cartel,’ the head of Mexico’s military style federal police 
was forced to step down in November 2008 (Tuckman, 2008.)  There 
are numerous other examples of high-level corruption (Economist, 
2008) and there have even been reports of federal officers kidnapping 
and killing on the orders of drug traffickers. 
The current dynamic has its origins in President Calderón’s December 
2006 response to the escalation in drug related violence within the 
country.  Then, intensifying the policy of his immediate predecessor 
Vincente Fox, he ordered a military crackdown.  There were initial 
reports of success by the autumn of 2007; in the fight against the Gulf 
‘cartel’ for example.  Since then, however, so called ‘inter-cartel violence’ 
has flared up as factions have sought to develop or defend trafficking 
corridors, particularly those into the United States.  For instance, the 
2008 death toll in Juárez alone was more than 1,300 by the end of 
November; a situation that has led commentators to compare the city 
with a failed state (Campo-Flores & Campbell, 2008).  Further west 
in Tijuana, one week in the autumn of 2008 saw 50 people murdered 
with the increasingly common and grizzly discovery of severed heads 
within the city becoming indicative of the high levels of brutal violence 
that characterize the current phase of bloodletting.  Despite several 
murders and arrests of leading members of trafficking groups, there 
is no sign that the extreme levels of violence involving drug ‘cartels’ 
and the state authorities will end soon.  Furthermore, while perhaps 
understandable bearing in mind the extent and nature of the challenges 
faced, an increasingly militarized response to the situation from the 
Mexican authorities has actually gone a long way to sustain the cycle 
of violence.  As noted elsewhere, “More military involvement in the 
‘drug war’ has increased corruption within the institution, generated 
human rights violations and failed to make a dent in the narcotics 
trade.”  Accordingly a more appropriate response would involve 
making reforms to police and justice systems (Meyer, M., Youngers, 
C. & Bewley-Taylor, D., 2007.)  This is an increasingly significant 
point when considered within the context of the forthcoming US 
aid package known as the Mérida Initiative.  The package, which is 
aimed at assisting Mexico address its security crisis, particularly the 
violence associated with the illicit drug trade, includes $500 million 
in equipment, training and other forms of assistance (Cook et al, 
2008.) According to comments made by the US Secretary of State, 
Condoleezza Rice, on a recent visit to Mexico, the money will be 
disbursed “soon”  (Economist, 2008.)  Yet, as the Washington Office 
on Latin America note, “judging by the [Mexican] Administration’s 
funding request, the Mérida Initiative sees drug trafficking almost 
exclusively as an operational law enforcement issue, equipping police 
and military units to fight traffickers, measuring success in terms of 
how many drugs are impeded from entering the United States and how 
many traffickers are arrested, and containing little support for long-
term institutional police and justice reform in Mexico” (WOLA, 2008.) 
As such, not only does the initiative do nothing to address the crucial 
issue of reducing drug demand in the United States, it also looks set to 
6perpetuate violence within urban drug markets, especially those along 
Mexico’s northern border. 
An upsurge in violence in the Caribbean has also been related to 
conflicts between drug traffickers and state authorities. The murder 
rate in Trinidad & Tobago increased by a factor of four between 1999 
and 2005. High profile, naval successes in seizing drugs in Caribbean 
waters have not prevented the rise in violence in the region. Indeed, 
murders have tended to spike upwards after the arrest of key players 
in drug trafficking operations, as their subordinates fight to win 
control (Bowling, 2008). Law enforcement efforts which displaced 
drug trafficking activities from Colombia to the Caribbean, combined 
with the increasing demand for cocaine by European consumers, have 
more recently stimulated the creation of the “West African corridor” 
to transport cocaine to Europe (Ibid, UNODC, 2007, 2008b), with 
disastrous results for the residents of Bissau, Lomé and Cape Verde.
This violence occurs far from the lives of Western consumers, whose 
media have paid more attention to the retail drug market. Here, the 
stereotypical encounter is between the armed drug dealer and the 
desperate addict. Although such encounters do occur, they are not 
typical of all retail transactions. Retail markets are not necessarily 
and continually violent. The absence of violence and the presence of 
cooperative relations between street drug dealers has, for example, 
been noted in two street heroin markets in Sydney, Australia 
(Coomber & Maher, 2006). This relative calm was presaged by an 
outbreak of violence in 1999 and 2000 in the Cabramatta area. This 
was reported to arise from conflict at higher levels of the market 
between competing criminal gangs (Ibid). 
The type and level of violence depends largely on the nature of 
the drug market, which is often shaped by the law enforcement 
response to it. An excellent illustration of this point comes from 
20 years of ethnographic work on the streets of New York (see 
case study 2). Open air, street-based drug markets often tend to 
be violent, as dealers compete for cash, customers, territory and 
reputation. Interviews with active drug dealers in St Louis, Missouri 
found several motives for violence (Topalli, Wright, & Fornango, 
2002). These included vengeance for robberies, the maintenance of 
reputations for dangerousness and the recovery of losses of cash and 
drugs. One of the interviewed dealers emphasised how important it 
is for street drug dealers to be known as potentially violent. “Without 
that [a reputation] you’ll get robbed every time you come out of the 
house.” He also summed up his fatalistic acceptance of the high 
levels of violence with the statement, “you live by the gun, you die 
by the gun”. But it is not only those who “live by the gun” who die 
by it. Violent robberies lead to retaliation and to further robberies to 
try to replace stolen money. Instrumental conflicts which may have 
originally been about cash and drugs bring in peers who feel they 
must engage in expressive violence in order to demonstrate their 
toughness. Cycles of violence, robbery and revenge are set up that 
suck in increasing numbers of people who have the misfortune to live 
in the socio-economically deprived areas which are most affected by 
open, street markets. 
By contrast, the development of delivery-style markets is associated 
with a welcome reduction in violence. While in open street markets, 
violence is used to communicate with potential competitors, hidden, 
delivery style dealers consciously avoid violence in order not to 
attract the attention of rivals and the police. Even though they may not 
lead to an overall reduction in the amount of drugs being consumed, 
hidden markets have other advantages. These include the absence of 
open street dealing, with all the negative effects that they produce 
for community safety, neighbourhood reputations and motivations 
for young men to aspire to criminal lifestyles. It seems that delivery 
markets are also more mobile, with dealers switching delivery points 
often to fox the police and rival dealers (May, Duffy, Few, & Hough, 
2005). This means that, in closed, delivery-style markets,  the reduction 
in violence is accompanied by a reduction in the spatial concentration 
of drug market related problems in poor neighbourhoods.
As noted above, the rise and fall of violence in many US cities in the 
1980s and 90s, has often been associated with the rise and fall in crack 
markets. Elevated levels of violence have been observed by police 
officers and criminologists after the introduction of crack to several 
countries, including the USA, the Caribbean and the United Kingdom 
(e.g. Braga, 2003). Crack cocaine has the psycho-pharmacological 
effects of inducing aggression, while heroin tends to sedate. Heroin 
does not lend itself to binge use, as this would produce overdose and 
death. In contrast, crack is frequently used in binge patterns, with 
users seeking immediate access to cash - often while still under the 
influence of the last dose - to keep on taking more. This, combined 
with exceptionally high profit margins in selling crack, causes higher 
levels of violence related to this form of cocaine than to other drugs. 
A study of 218 drug-related murders at the height of the crack problem 
in New York in 1988 found that 54% were related to crack, mostly 
involving “systemic” violence between drug dealers, or dealers and 
users (Goldstein, Brownstein, Ryan, & Bellucci, 1997).  It is important, 
however, to remind ourselves that not all drug dealers “live by the 
gun”. A drug dealer who was interviewed in Georgia, USA, reported 
that he had recently had money stolen from him by someone he knew. 
When asked what he was going to do about it, he replied, “fucking 
nothing, I mean, what am I gonna go do – shoot him?” (Jacques & 
Wright, 2008: 243)
7CASE STUDY 2:  The evolution of violence in New 
York City drug markets
New York researchers, Ric Curtis and Travis Wendel (2007), 
have observed three phases in the evolution of retail drug 
distribution. The first phase involved distribution by criminal 
gangs who took on some of the characteristics of a legal 
corporation. There was a clear hierarchy, with leaders controlling 
access to imported drugs, and managing the division of labour 
between drug sellers, runners, lookouts and enforcers. Drug 
sales tended to be centred on fixed distribution points, often 
houses or apartments in deprived neighbourhoods. It was the 
enforcers’ job to ensure, through actual or threatened violence, 
that buyers and employees did not rip off the gang, and that 
rival drug selling operations were not able to compete in these 
areas. Violence was often deliberately spectacular (such as the 
torture by extraction of teeth reported in Southside, Queens 
in 1990) in order to rule the market through fear. 
Police operations against these gangs became more 
sophisticated. The dominant model had been “buy and bust” 
operations which filled prisons with low level dealers, but made 
little dent in the gangs’ ability to keep selling drugs. These gave 
way to intelligence-led operations, involving lengthy surveillance, 
which enabled the police to arrest entire supply chains at once. 
As the main players in the drug marker realised the dangers of 
being connected to the street level, and that operating from 
fixed locations exposed them to sustained surveillance, the 
market became more fluid. Between 1995 and 2000 there was 
a reduction in the proportion of interviewed arrestees who 
reported buying crack at fixed locations, and an increase in 
those buying them on the street (Taylor & Brownstein, 2003).  
Curtis and Wendel report that wholesale drug suppliers 
outsourced retail distribution to freelance drug dealers. These 
dealers could not afford to pay for enforcers, and so had to 
ensure access to lucrative selling locations by their own 
reputation for violence. This led to a wave of shootings. 
Gentrification of many of the drug selling areas, combined 
with intensive policing, pressured the market again to take a 
new form. Curtis and Wendel report that the wider availability 
of pagers and mobile phones enabled the drug market to 
move indoors, to a model of ordered deliveries. This model 
started out in the marijuana business, and has since spread to 
other drugs. It involves an individual or partnership providing 
the capital to buy the drugs wholesale. The drugs are then 
distributed through a small team of couriers, directed by 
dispatchers. Labour relations tend to be less conflictual than in 
either the corporate or freelance model of street distribution. 
And violence is absolutely to be avoided, as the delivery teams 
are only able to operate in the absence of police attention. 
CASE STUDY 3:  The London crack market
Although many London cocaine users already knew how to 
make smokeable versions of cocaine, the retail trade in crack 
only took off in London in the late 1980s. In the early 1990s, its 
street price fell by 50% and use increased rapidly, especially in 
deprived areas of the inner city. Crack is sold in three types of 
market: open street dealing, delivery markets and from fixed 
locations, or crack houses. Crack houses have been further 
categorised into three types: fortified retail outlets, take-overs 
(where dealers take over the flat of a vulnerable tenant) and 
places which combine the sale of sex with the sale of crack 
(Greater London Alcohol and Drug Alliance, 2004). As in the 
USA, there has been much anecdotal reporting of increased 
violence in the vicinity of crack markets and houses, although 
there is less investment in statistical research to test these 
reports. Various high profile murders have been linked to the 
trade in crack. In September 2007, Amato Wright, 39, was 
convicted of murdering his mother. The prosecution argued that 
he did so in an attempt to get cash to buy crack. In February 
2007,  a 15 year old boy,  Billy Cox, was shot dead at his home 
in Clapham in February 2007.  Newspaper accounts attributed 
this to rivalries between crack dealers, but other accounts 
suggest that more trivial, reputational conflicts were involved.  
Two men have recently been charged with the fatal stabbing of 
Melvin Bryan, 18, in Edmonton in July 2008. One of them was 
also charged with possession of crack with intent to supply. 
In response to fears over the effects of crack dealing, the 
Metropolitan Police have launched various operations to tackle 
the trade. In a recent book, Detective Sergeant Harry Keeble 
claims to have closed all the crack houses in Haringey in 1999 
and 2000. He reports that he followed up intelligence reports 
and surveillance by raiding premises in force, with significant 
effects in reducing shootings and robberies in the area (Keeble 
& Hollington, 2008*). However, violence rose again after the 
end of this operation. A more rigorously evaluated initiative, 
known as Operation Crackdown, using similar methods 
produced no effect on price, purity or perceived availability of 
drugs (Best, Strang, Beswick, & Gossop, 2001). This evaluation 
did not examine the effect on violence, and it is possible that 
operations such as this can encourage drug dealers to change 
their methods to become less visible and so less harmful to 
surrounding communities.
There are now reports that the London crack market has 
followed the New York pattern of becoming more closed,  
with less crack dealing from fixed locations, and dealers 
preferring to sell only to people that they already know (Pitts, 
2008).  As the effects of crack on its users have become more  
 
 *    We are cautious about the reports of this book, as some quotes in it bear an uncanny 
similarity to dialogue from the HBO television series The Wire.
8widely known, the rapid increase in users over the 1990s has 
slowed. The capacity of treatment agencies has expanded rapidly 
and the criminal justice system has been used to encourage 
crack users to enter treatment. The police have been given 
powers (including crack house closure orders) to close and seal 
premises that are being used as crack houses. Various community 
initiatives have been supported, which combine community 
development with youth work and drug treatment. Between 
2002/3 and 2006/7, the number of murders in London fell by 
10% and the number of recorded firearms offences fell by 14% 
(Povey, Coleman, Kaiza, Hoare, & Jansson, 2007). The effects of the 
crack market and its regulation in these reductions are unclear. 
 
DRUG MARKET CONTExTS
The effect of drugs on urban violence goes alongside the effects 
of poverty. A study of the increase in homicide rates in US cities 
between 1982 and 1992 found that violence increased fastest in those 
cities with increasing levels of socio-economic disadvantage (Strom 
& MacDonald, 2007). A different analysis of the links between 
homicide, drug markets and socio-demographic characteristics 
has also been carried out for 132 US cities between 1984 and 
2000 (Ousey & Lee, 2007). This found that the effects of declining 
drug markets were significant in predicting reductions in violence, 
but that other factors, including the age profile of drug market 
participants, and changes in socio-economic conditions, were 
also influential. In cities where the average age of drug arrestees 
increased, and where socio-economic conditions improved, murder 
rates tended to decline fastest. An earlier analysis by Ousey and Lee 
which included pre-existing socio-economic conditions found that 
the relationship between drug markets and homicide depends on the 
level of resource deprivation in the city. Larger drug markets are 
associated with higher murder rates in poor cities, but not in rich 
ones (Ousey & Lee, 2002). Ousey and Lee (2007) also note that 
the statistical link between drug markets and homicide has reduced 
over time. They speculate that this may be because norms about the 
acceptability of violence and drug markets have both changed.  As 
young people grow up in neighbourhoods contaminated by crack 
and violence, they can learn that there are better ways to live, as 
long as opportunities are provided to put this learning into practice. 
This points to the importance of the concept of collective efficacy, 
which was also used by Strom and McDonald as part of the 
explanation for the increase in violence in the USA in the 1980s. 
Collective efficacy has been defined as “the linkage of cohesion 
and mutual trust with shared expectations for intervening in support 
of neighbourhood social control” (Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999: 
611-612). Some neighbourhoods are better able to prevent and resist 
violence than others. This ability is influenced by levels of poverty, 
residential mobility and relationships with the police. Sampson 
and Raudenbush found that collective efficacy was lower in socio-
economically deprived areas, and that both collective efficacy and 
socio-economic disadvantage were important predictors of disorder. 
Mechanisms of informal social control can be damaged where local 
residents have no support from state institutions, or where there is 
conflict between local residents and the police. For example, if a 
resident who objects to drugs being sold outside her home can be 
killed with impunity by a drug dealer, with no serious investigation 
by the police, then this makes such informal control far less likely. 
And if the police are seen as being in conflict with the whole 
community, rather than just the offenders who live or work there, 
again this will damage the collective ability to reduce disorder. Even 
worse are situations where the police are seen as being corrupt and 
in the pay of drug traffickers, or to be engaged in serious violation 
of the human rights of local residents. Unfortunately, many of these 
problems affect the World’s most violent cities.
In some cases, the state itself can become one of the main sources 
of violence related to the drug market. Even if we leave aside those 
countries which still use the death penalty for drug trafficking 
offences, there are others (e.g. Thailand, Mexico and Brazil) where 
drug control policies, either explicitly or implicitly, have led to 
high levels of urban violence committed by state agencies. For 
example, in 2003 in Thailand a war on drugs was announced, with 
prominent politicians stating that the police were fully justified in 
using violence against drug dealers and that deaths were inevitable. 
In December 2003, the Royal Thai Police announced that 1,329 
people had been killed in nine months, of whom 72 were reported 
as having been killed by the police. Witnesses reported numerous 
extra-judicial killings by agents of the state of people who had been 
placed on “blacklists” by local officials (Cohen, 2004). After a coup 
in 2006 replaced the Thai government, an official report found that 
half the people killed in the 2003 war on drugs had no link to the 
drug trade (The Economist, 2008). Drug traffickers are not the only 
source of lethal and other violence in the operation of drug markets.
A final influence on violence in the drug market is the availability 
of firearms. The profits afforded by drug sales provide the means 
necessary to buy guns through legal and illegal channels. So, once 
guns are introduced to a drug market, it is exceptionally hard to 
eliminate them. This provides an incentive both to prevent the 
development of violent drug markets and to limit the availability or 
firearms to players in these markets.
9Overall, the available evidence suggests that there is a strong link 
between the presence of markets for illicit drugs and the level of 
urban violence. However, the strength of this link is influenced by 
several factors. These include:
The degree to which the wholesale drug trade has infiltrated the •	
institutional structure of the city. Cities in Latin America and the 
Caribbean where the drugs market has become entwined with 
local businesses, bureaucracies and politicians seem to be the 
most vulnerable to violence.
The type of retail drug market•	 . Hidden, delivery-based markets 
seem to be less violent than open street markets, especially when 
street markets involve chaotic competition between low-level 
dealers.
The type of drug being sold•	 . Crack markets tend to be more 
violent than markets for other drugs.
Socio-economic conditions•	 . Socio-economically deprived cities 
and neighbourhoods are more vulnerable to drug markets and 
related violence. Deprivation also causes low collective efficacy, 
which reduces the potential for informal social control of disorder 
and violence.
State violence•	 . When the war on drugs turns hot, then rates of 
urban violence can soar, as was seen in Thailand in 2003, and is 
still occurring in Mexico and Brazil.
The availability of firearms•	 . Drug markets flooded with automatic 
and semi-automatic weapons are naturally more lethally violent.
CASE STUDY 4:  Expanding the “Boston miracle”
At the end of the 1980s, the US city of Boston experienced a 
rapid upsurge in its murder rate, from about 15 per 100,000 
in the mid-1980s, to 25 in 1990. These murders were heavily 
concentrated amongst young, black males, often using semi-
automatic weapons that had recently been sold in the 
legal market. The victims tended to be residents of just a 
few, severely deprived neighbourhoods, including Roxbury, 
Dorchester and Mattapan. There was a significant overlap 
between perpetrators and victims of knife and gun crime. 
Many were members of street gangs involved in the expanding 
crack market. 
After a notorious incident in 1992, in which rival gang members 
attempted murder during a funeral at the Morning Star Baptist 
Church in Mattapan, a coalition of faith groups was formed. 
Despite initial distrust between this Ten Point Coalition and 
the police, they worked together from 1996 in organising “gang 
forums”. These forums played a part in Operation Ceasefire 
in May of that year. This involved individual frequent, gang-
involved offenders being invited to attend meetings with police 
officers, church ministers and social services personnel. They 
were given the choice between accepting offers of help with 
education, training and other services, or intensive attention 
from the police. It was made clear to them that any violent 
activity would lead to a speedy and tough response.  The plan 
was widely publicised, and the police followed through on 
their threat to respond rigorously to offenders who violated 
the ceasefire. The initiative was led by the Boston Gun Project 
working group (sponsored by the National Institute of Justice 
and involving Boston Police Department alongside a wide rang 
of partners). This project also focused enforcement attention 
on preventing the trafficking of semi-automatic weapons.
Figure 1: Graph showing reductions in youth homicide during the 
Operation Ceasefire intervention (reproduced from Braga, Hureau, & 
Winship, 2008)
An evaluation of Operation Ceasefire by researchers at the 
Harvard Kennedy School (Braga, Kennedy, Waring, & Piehl, 2001) 
found that it caused a significant decrease in the rate of youth 
murders, in comparison with other cities which did not use this 
approach. The 63% reduction in the monthly youth homicide 
rate led others to dub this the “Boston miracle”. The researchers 
differentiate this problem-oriented deterrence strategy (which 
they call “pulling levers”) from the more broadly focused order 
maintenance policing of New York City’s “zero tolerance” 
approach. Since this successful initiative in Boston, the pulling 
levers strategy has been evaluated in other US cities, including 
Minneapolis, Stockton and Lowell. The published evaluations all 
report that it has produced reductions in homicide which have 
not been seen in comparable cities that did not use this strategy 
(Braga, 2008; Braga, Pierce, McDevitt et al., 2008; McGarrell, 
Chermak, Wilson, & Corsaro, 2006). Another advantage of 
this approach is that it builds relationships with disadvantaged 
communities through partnerships with them, rather than 
damaging these relationships through the conflictual policing of 
the zero tolerance approach (Harcourt, 2002).
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The problem with the Boston miracle is that it was not 
sustained. The police officer, Gary French, who led the project 
moved to new duties in 2000, and the partnership meetings 
ended. Manpower shortages in the early 2000s, combined with 
the effects on police priorities of the 9/11 attacks, made it 
difficult to continue strategic policing operations against youth 
homicides. Internal rivalries hampered efforts by both the police 
and the Ten Point Coalition. There were 43 murders in Boston 
in 1997. This had increased to 73 by 2005 (Bureau of Justice 
Statistics).  In 2007, Operation Ceasefire was reinvigorated, with 
Gary French back in charge. There was a reduction in murders 
between 2006 and 2007, but no thorough evaluation has yet 
been published of this new chapter in the Boston story (Braga, 
Hureau, & Winship, 2008).
CONCLUSIONS
There are a number of general lessons for policy makers that can 
be taken from the research and case studies presented here.  The 
first is that the majority of urban violence, as seen in those Latin 
American and Caribbean cities which are most severely affected, 
is related to trafficking, rather than the use of illicit drugs. While 
some urban violence is certainly perpetrated by individuals under 
the influence of illegal psychoactive substances, the extremely 
high profit margins associated with the illicit market incentivizes 
often-violent involvement in the drug trade.  Countries which have 
not been able to impose the rule of law have struggled to reduce 
violence and corruption. 
The second is that the link between drug markets and urban violence 
depends on the level and distribution of poverty. Cities that are 
less disadvantaged and less unequal are less vulnerable to the 
institutionalisation of drugs, guns and corruption which combine 
to produce violence.  Social structures which exclude citizens from 
achieving culturally expected levels of consumption and autonomy 
breed resentment and encourage the development of underground 
economies, in which young men seek cash and respect through 
violence (Bourgois, 1997).
The third is that state action itself can be a major contributor or 
cause of urban violence.  Drug policy and law enforcement methods 
do much to shape the drug market, even if they cannot eliminate 
it.  As such, decisions made by governments and police officials 
have influenced the global pattern of drug-related violence, as well 
as the level of violence that drug dealers are prepared to engage in. 
For example, at the meta-level, over a number of years increased 
interdiction efforts along trafficking routes from Colombia to the USA 
has contributed to the development of violent trafficking pathways 
through the Caribbean and more recently West Africa.  This has 
influenced levels of drug related urban violence within both regions, 
particularly the former.  Further, arms races between dealers and law 
enforcement agencies at the city level has in some instances led to 
whole neighbourhoods being caught in the crossfire. The failure of 
the war on drugs model in Rio de Janeiro, for example, indicates that 
drug control models focused on repression need reevaluation. More 
measured operations in Boston, London and New York (all in very 
different socio-economic contexts to both one another and to Rio de 
Janeiro) have been able to have some positive impacts in reducing the 
violence associated with retail drug markets, even if there has been 
little apparent effect on rates of drug use.2
Some commentators have seen these lessons and taken them to mean 
 that the appropriate response is to legalise the trade in currently illicit 
substances, as this would take the trade out of the hands of violent 
criminals. The potential effects in reducing violence, if poverty 
and corruption are not simultaneously eliminated, are debatable 
however.  The effects on drug consumption are unpredictable. It has 
been argued that drug use and associated violence would inevitably 
rise (Inciardi, 1999), although this analysis concentrates on psycho-
pharmacological violence by users, and not systemic violence by 
traffickers and dealers. It has also been argued that violence is not 
caused by the drugs market alone, but that these markets provide 
a context in which people who are already violent can operate, 
in neighbourhoods where violence accompanies economic and 
social exclusion (Sommers & Baskin, 1997). In any case, there 
is little political appetite for a wholesale departure from existing 
prohibition-oriented UN drug conventions in the countries that are 
most influential in their development and enforcement. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is important to note that the recommendations we give here for 
reducing the link between drug markets and urban violence are 
provisional, as there have been very few rigorous tests of such 
responses. That said,  
Drug enforcement strategies must be based on a close •	
understanding of the structure and dynamics of specific illicit 
drug markets.  More time and effort needs to be invested in 
finding out about the particulars of local drug markets and the 
2    It is also possible that the escalation of violent disputes in the retail drug trade might be halted if drug 
dealers could seek redress for robbery from the police (as women working as prostitutes can in cases of 
rape) (Topalli, Wright, & Fornango, 2002). It is very difficult, however, to imagine how law enforcement 
agencies could respond to robberies of drugs and related cash without criminalising the victim, and so 
deterring them from reporting these robberies.
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violence associated with them. For example, which drugs are 
most popular? What form does the market take? Is violence in 
the locality directly related to drug markets, or to other causes? 
Who is most likely to participate and suffer from violence? What 
weapons do they use? What is the geographical and temporal 
pattern of these incidents? What local organisations are interested 
in working in partnership on this issue?
Enhanced information must be used to focus more on the objective •	
of reducing the violence associated with the illicit market rather 
than attempting to ‘win’ a battle with drug dealers.  This latter 
approach can be counterproductive in terms of market disruption 
and subsequent escalations in violence.  Put another way, law 
enforcement agencies, to use Wendel and Curtis’ phrase, should 
therefore do more to “train the dog” of drug markets (Wendel and 
Curtis, 2007.)  For Wendel and Curtis, this concept means that 
just as a dog continually responds to the physical signals (not just 
the verbal commands) that its owner sends out, so drug markets 
are always responding to the signals that law enforcement 
agencies send out. If customs agencies manage to close down 
one smuggling route, drug traffickers will find another.  If city 
police target one form of drug selling, drug dealers will change 
their tactics.  Consequently, if these agencies focus on the most 
violent practices, traffickers and dealers are likely to shift to less 
violent ways of working.  However, if these agencies then let up 
the pressure, traffickers and dealers will revert to the methods that 
are the most attractive and profitable to themselves, even if these 
are the most violent. 
It is important to note here that these first two recommendations are 
implemented in the only evaluated intervention strategy that has been 
shown repeatedly to reduce urban violence related to drug markets. 
The “pulling levers” approach of Operation Ceasefire, including its 
direct engagement with drug dealers, and the projects it has inspired 
has been tested successfully in several cities.  However, while 
interventions informed by Operation Ceasefire are being developed 
in Manchester, Glasgow and Southwark in the UK, it has not yet been 
tested outside the context of medium-sized US cities, which have 
different levels of drug use and violence to those experienced in cities 
in Latin America, Europe and the Caribbean.  The Boston experience 
also shows how difficult it is to sustain the reductions achieved. 
Where compromised by corruption, law enforcement agencies •	
and criminal justice systems must be overhauled. It seems clear 
that in some countries, such as Mexico and Brazil, the conditions 
necessary for the implementation of, for example, a “pulling 
levers” approach within urban areas are currently not present. 
As such, some level of reform is necessary in order to generate 
an environment amenable to the implementation of policies 
aimed at reducing drug related urban violence. Such reform 
efforts should include higher salaries, and enhanced oversight 
and control mechanisms to root out corruption and prosecute and 
sanction those who engage in corruption.   
Law enforcement agencies should stay within the rule of law •	
when intervening in the drug trade.  It is tempting to combat 
the illegality and damage associated with illicit drugs by taking 
extra-legal shortcuts that offer tough action.  However, by 
undermining the rule of law, such actions increase the attraction 
of corruption and the possibilities for drug traffickers and dealers 
to set themselves up as defenders of the people against an 
oppressive state. Paramilitary operations by state agencies - or 
by other agencies supported by the state - are a form of violence 
and so are to be discouraged.
Efforts should be made to reduce the availability of firearms in •	
cities affected by drug markets.  Of course, guns can be smuggled 
almost as easily as drugs can, so they will never be eliminated 
from the illegal drugs market. However, to make semi-automatic 
weapons legally available to drug dealers or their contacts, as was 
evidently happening in Boston in the mid 1990s, seems reckless, 
to say the least.  It is worth noting here that an estimated 90% 
of the weapons used by Mexican drug ‘cartels’ are purchased 
at US gun stores and gun shows.  It is, therefore, plausible to 
that the high levels of drug related violence within Mexico is at 
least partly attributable to lax gun controls north of the border. 
(Keating, 2008, Meyer, Youngers & Bewley-Taylor, 2007.) 
States should seek to reduce the levels of economic disadvantage •	
and inequality in cities, especially within those most affected by 
the drug trade. While this recommendation relates to complex 
socio-environmental and economic issues that stretch beyond the 
realm of drug policy per se, it is clear that in these cities poverty 
and violence feed off one another.  Consequently, reducing poverty 
will do much to reduce the temptations of young men to become 
drug sellers, of poorly paid police officers to ally themselves to 
drug traffickers and of violence to become regarded as a way of 
life. Violence may also be reduced by successful efforts to boost 
collective efficacy and social cohesion in poor neighbourhoods. 
However, any gains made will always be likely to slip back as 
long as the underlying poverty is not addressed.
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